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Statement by Employer to His Employees Concerning
Cause of Discharge of Fellow Employee Is Not
Privileged-Sias v. General Motors Corp.
Plaintiff, employed for ten years by defendant as a plant guard
and held in high repute by the community, was summarily discharged for allegedly taking company property. The property in
question was an automobile generator that plaintiff claimed to believe was one he had arranged to purchase from the company as
salvage for use in his own car. Plaintiff removed the generator in
an open manner, explaining to other employees what he was doing.
The generator was found in the guard booth where plaintiff had
left it with another guard while he went to the plant medical
department for treatment of an injury. On his return to the booth
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he was confronted by his superiors with the property, informed he
had violated regulations, and fired. Shortly thereafter, in an attempt to arrest rumors and restore morale, defendant informed
certain other guards, selected at random, of the reason for plaintiff's discharge. Plaintiff brought an action for slander. The trial
court ruled the communication unprivileged and submitted to the
jury only the question of truth. A verdict for plaintiff was returned.
On appeal from an order denying defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, held, affirmed. Fellow employees do
not have sufficient interest in the discharge of a co-worker to
protect by qualified privilege a slanderous communication made to
them by the employer explaining the cause of the discharge. Sias
v. General Motors Corp., 372 Mich. 542, 127 N.W.2d 357 (1964).1
The law of qualified privilege recognizes that protection of
private interests may justify publication of false and injurious communications about third parties when made in good faith.2 In
determining whether a privilege should attach, a court weighs the
injury likely to result to the slandered party against the interests
to be served by making the communication.3 The general view is
that a privilege will attach only when a "sufficiently important"
interest of the recipient or some third party4 is at stake, or when the
publisher has an interest in the publication and the recipient
possesses either a common5 or reciprocal interest in, or duty concerning, the publication.6 Thus, for example, if it is the publisher's
interest of the recipient or some third party4 is at stake or when the
some corresponding interest in the matter or some duty to perform
with respect to it.1 The Michigan courts have put the rule as follows:
"It extends to all communications made bona fide upon any subjectmatter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in
reference to which he has a duty to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty." 8 This rule is endorsed in major treatises on
1. Hereinafter cited as the principal case.
2. For an early discussion of the policy questions involved, see Holmes, Privilege,
Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1894). See generally Veeder, The History and
Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 CouJM. L. REv. 33 (1904). For strongly contrasting
views as to the relative importance of the interests involved, see Pound, Interests of
Personality, 28 HARv. L. REv. 446 (1915), and Green, The Right To Communicate, 35
N.Y.U.L. REv. 903 (1960).

3. One view of the things to be taken into account by courts in this balancing of
interests is presented in Harper, Privileged Defamation, 22 VA. L. REv. 642 (1936). This
same analysis is presented in 1 HARPER 8: JAMES, TORTS § 5.25, at 437-38 (1956),
4. R.Es'l'ATEMENT, TORTS § 595 (1938).
5. Id. § 596.
6. Id. § 594.

7. "This interest on the part of the recipient is an absolute prerequisite." Jones,
Interest and Duty in Relation to Qualified Privilege, 22 MICH. L. REv. 437, 440 n.11
(1924).
8. Bostetter v. Kirsch Co., 319 Mich. 547, 556-57, 30 N.W.2d Zl6, 279-80 (1948),
quoting from Bacon v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 66 Mich. 166, 33 N.W. 181 (1887).
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defamation. 9 A critical uncertainty exists, however, with respect to
what "corresponding interest or duty" will suffice for the privilege to
attach. In the principal case the defendant's very real interest in
morale was not disputed, but the court concluded that the corresponding interest of the recipients was not sufficient.10
While the recipients of the communication in the principal case
did not need such information in order to perform a duty, a number
of courts have recognized that employees might well have an interest
in the cause of discharge of another employee.11 Lord Esher, for
example, in Hunt v. Great Northern Railway,12 in which a railroad
company informed all its employees of the reason for plaintiff's discharge, declared he could not "imagine a case in which the reciprocal
interests could be more clear."13 He pointed out that the employer
had an interest in communicating to his employees what was expected of them and that the employees had an interest in knowing
what the consequences of such misconduct would be. 14 In the principal case other interests might also have been present. Employees
may very well have an interest in the honesty of their co-workers, as
the conduct of each worker may reflect on the department as a
whole. 15 Moreover, employees are likely to have an interest in their
own morale, 16 and an employer's efforts to alleviate anxiety by clarifying a highly ambiguous job situation will certainly have an impact
on the morale of the remaining workers. In addition, even beyond
their separate interests, employees may be considered to have a common interest with their employer and other employees in the affairs
of their department. Both Prosser and Newell indicate that such a
mutual interest would support the defense of qualified privilege.17
9. NEWELL, SLANDER. & LmEL § 341 (4th ed. 1924); ODGERS, LIBEL & SLANDER 206 (6th
ed. 1929).
IO. The court in the principal case appears to be insisting that the recipient
possess an independent "interest" in the sense that his own welfare is to some degree
affected. Compare the Restatement's position, which requires merely that "the
recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter will be of service in the lawful pro•
tection •••" of the publisher's interest. REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 594(b) (1938).
11. Denver Public Warehouse Co. v. Holloway, 34 Colo. 432, 83 Pac. 131 (1905);
Gardner v. Standard Oil Co., 179 Miss. 176, 175 So. 203 (1937); Louisiana Oil Co. v.
Renno, 173 Miss. 609, 157 So. 705 (1934); Hall v. Rice, 117 Neb. 813, 223 N.W. 4 (1929);
Ramsdell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 79 N.J.L. 379, 75 Atl. 444 (1910).
12. [1891] 2 Q.B. 189.
13. Id. at 191.
14. Ibid. It should be noted that many courts, contrary to Lord Esher, might be
unwilling to find a privilege when the communication is made to the entire work
force. See Ramsdell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 79 N.J.L. 379, 381, 75 Atl. 444, 444-45 (1910),
where a special point is made of the fact that the recipients were members of plaintiff's
own department.
15. See Hall v. Rice, 117 Neb. 813,223 N.W. 4 (1929).
16. The existence of a morale problem over the incident means the other guards
were disturbed by their own job situation. The sudden and unexplained departure of
plaintiff might well have caused them serious concern over their own job security.
17. PROSSER, TORTS § 110, at 809 (3d ed. 1964). He indicates a privilege exists when

January 1965]

Recent Developments

561

The Michigan Supreme Court has twice previously held that
general employees have no corresponding interest or duty that would
warrant extension of a qualified privilege to communications made
by the employer to them about a fellow employee; 18 but the principal
case is distinguishable from these cases, and, in fact, they were not
even cited. In neither of these earlier cases was there any indication
of the existence of a morale problem. In both earlier cases the
communications were made as accusations, and among the recipients
were other employees who were without any special interest in why
the plaintiff might be disciplined. Moreover, in both of these earlier
cases the communications were held privileged with respect to
certain other employees whose duties involved the hire or discharge
of others or the investigation of irregularities. 19 Rather than indicating that employer communications to employees about co-workers
are never privileged, these holdings seem to stand only for the
proposition that no privilege exists when no interest or duty of
the recipient can be shown. Holding privileged those communications made to employees whose duties required they have such
information might even lend support to a finding of privilege in
the principal case, for the interests of the employer and employees
in labor tranquility is just as significant as their mutual interest in
the successful performance of an employee's duties.20
The holding in the principal case appears to impose an unfortunate limitation upon qualified privilege. The implication is
that, in the absence of some duty of the recipient for which he
needs such information, the only interest of the recipient that will
suffice for a privilege to attach is some specific pecuniary interest,
unless, of course, the communication has to do with some public
matter in which all citizens may be presumed to have an interest.21
If, indeed, this is the inference to be drawn, the view that dollar"officers, agents or employees ••. communicate with ••• other employees ••• about
the affairs of the organization itself ••••" Id.; NEWELL, op. cit. supra note 9, § 432.
18. Poledna v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 360 Mich. 129, 103 N.W.2d 789 (1960); Johnson v. Gerasimos, 247 Mich. 248, 225 N.W. 636 (1929).
19. That the employee-recipients needed such information to perform their job
duties adequately was also the ground upon which a privilege was found in Bacon v.
Michigan Cent. R.R., 66 Mich. 166, 33 N.W. 181 (1887).
20. In a much earlier Michigan case it was held that "there is no right to make
untrue and injurious statements concerning others when they are not made to persons
having right and power to investigate, and in an honest attempt to invoke such
investigation .•••" Foster v. Scripps, 39 Mich. 376, 382 (1878). But just nine years later
in Bacon v. Michigan Cent. R.R., supra note 19, the court found a privilege where no
duty to investigate was involved. In the later case, the railroad's station agents, the
recipients of the communication, had no investigatory responsibility. They did, however, need such information because of their resP.onsibility for hiring local help. If
the same openness to recognition of interests that characterized the Bacon decision
had persisted, the court in the principal case might have found a privilege.
21. The principal case, of course, involves only private interests.
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value is the ultimate criterion in determining the sufficiency of
a reciprocal interest in a commercial setting has received regrettable support.
Why the court in the principal case ignored the very real interests
involved and the considerable contrary authority is not indicated.
On the facts of the case one may very well feel that the defendantemployer's conduct was unreasonable and that he should be liable,
but one may well quarrel with the means by which this result was
obtained. In the absence of malice or some other abuse destroying
the privilege, 22 imposition of liability in situations like this undermines the very protection that the qualified privilege is intended to
provide to parties seeking to further legitimate interests.

22. One possible reason why the court held no privilege attached in the principal
case is that in Michigan, once a defense of qualified privilege attaches, it is quite
difficult for the plaintiff to show sufficient abuse to destroy it. For a discussion of what
is required to overcome the defense, see Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134, 97 N.W.2d 719
(1959). For two different, yet less rigorous, approaches, see RE.STATEMENT, TORTS §§
600-05 (1938) and Hallen, Character of Belief Necessary for the ConditionalPrivilege
in Defamation, 25 ILL. L. Ray. 865 (1931).

